Students\u27 Shrinking First Amendment Rights in the Public Schools: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser by Block, Robert
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 35 
Issue 3 Spring 1986 Article 6 
Students' Shrinking First Amendment Rights in the Public 
Schools: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 
Robert Block 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Robert Block, Students' Shrinking First Amendment Rights in the Public Schools: Bethel School District 
No. 403 v. Fraser, 35 DePaul L. Rev. 739 (1986) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol35/iss3/6 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact 
digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
NOTE
STUDENTS' SHRINKING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 403 v. FRASER
INTRODUCTION
American courts treat the first amendment' freedom of expression and the
corollary freedom to receive information as paramount in the Constitution.2
However, courts do not grant the full range of free speech rights to minors.
For example, some forms of expression, such as pornography, are available
to adults but are forbidden to minors. Also, certain content-based regulation
of speech in primary and secondary schools may be necessary to maintain
peace and order in the classroom. The Supreme Court recently decided that
a minor's constitutional rights under the fourth amendment can be out-
weighed by the interests of school administrators to run a safe and quiet
place to learn.3 Until recently, the Court made no similar pronouncement
1. The first amendment to the United States Constitution states in part that "Congress
shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has authorized state limits on speech. See, e.g., Young
v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (city may zone adult theatres and bookstores
to disperse them; adult materials deemed less deserving of protection than other types of speech);
Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (political candidates had no constitutional right
to advertise on city buses; city has interest in protecting captive audience of riders); Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (speech and advocacy proscribed when directed toward inciting
or producing imminent lawless action).
See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 582 (1978) (describes recurring debate
between first amendment absolutists and those who advocate careful balancing of speaker's
and government's interests). Professor Tribe argues that the balancing test optimally maintains
free speech rights because the test is less open to court manipulation. Id. at 583-84. However,
a dilemma faces any court that attempts to balance one preferred right over another. Absolute
freedom of speech rights would eliminate any problems the court may face in balancing all
interests. Absolutists argue that when speech rights are balanced against state interests, the
inherent imprecision in the decisions leaves the law perpetually unsettled. See, e.g., Sciarrino,
"Free Exercise" Footsteps in the Defamation Forest: Are "New Religions" Lost?, 7 AM. J.
TRIAL ADvoc. 307, 318 (1984).
3. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985), is one of the Supreme Court's latest
decisions on schoolhouse rights. In T.L.O., the Court severely limited the fourth amendment
rights of students by holding that public school officials may conduct searches of students
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about the first amendment.4
In Fraser v. Bethel School District No. 403,1 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals provided the Supreme Court with a fresh opportunity to define the
scope of first amendment rights in the schools. The court of appeals found
that a school district violated a high school student's first amendment rights
when it suspended him for making a sexually suggestive speech at a school
assembly. Although the appellate court did not acknowledge the full range
of cases in this field, it did recognize and discuss two main issues. First, the
court found that the speech was not obscene for purposes of use by minors.
Second, the court decided that the school's interest in maintaining order did
not outweigh students' right to free expression. On review, the Supreme
Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's rationale and held that the speech was
obscene.
This Note begins by discussing generally the first amendment rights of
children and then more specifically the rights of children in the public schools.
The Note will next illustrate how the Supreme Court in Fraser failed to
properly address the factual findings of the Ninth Circuit's decision and
disregarded its own precedent with respect to students' first amendment
rights. To remedy the confusion generated by the Supreme Court's decision
in Fraser, the Note proposes a model for examining students' rights. This
proposed model is intended to provide a systematic methodology for ana-
lyzing students' first amendment rights, while ensuring proper deference to
prior Supreme Court students' rights decisions.
without first obtaining a search warrant and that the search can be performed if it is based on
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 743. This standard ignores the procedural safeguards provided by
the fourth amendment to adults. As Justice Brennan argued in his dissent, the T.L.O. Court
ignored three principles that are conventionally believed to underlie the fourth amendment.
First, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless a specific qualified exception exists.
Second, the constitutional standard for searches is that officials have probable cause to believe
that a crime has occurred and that evidence will be found in the place searched. Third, searches
may be justified if the individual's privacy is protected during the search. Id. at 750-51 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
It is not clear whether T.L.O. should be limited to the fourth amendment, or whether the
Court intends to challenge other constitutional rights of children by the same analysis. Rush,
The Warren and Burger Courts on State, Parent and Child Conflict Resolution: A Comparative
Analysis and Proposed Methodology, 36 HASnNos L.J. 461, 486 n.146 (1985). As evidence of
the latter trend, see Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984) (preventive detention of juveniles
constitutional, limiting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)). See generally Note, Where Have All
the Children Gone? The Supreme Court Finds Pretrial Detention of Minors Constitutional, 34
DEPAUL L. REV. 733 (1985) (canvass of Supreme Court developments in constitutional
protections for juveniles) [hereinafter cited as Note, Where Have All The Children Gone?].
4. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986) (most recent Supreme
Court decision regarding first amendment rights of students). In Fraser, the Court held that
the use of lewd and obscene speech by a student in order to make a point in a nominating
speech for another student could be regulated by school officials. Id. at 3166.
5. 755 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985).
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I. BACKGROUND
Courts have advanced various theories in limiting a minor's freedom of
expression. One theory is that speech that might not be obscene for adults
should be isolated from children to protect them from psychic harm. This
theory is consistent with the paternalistic scheme of American law that
exempts children from civil and criminal liability because of their immatu-
rity.6 A second restriction on children's first amendment rights is the state's
interest in promoting peace and order in the classroom. In this context, the
Supreme Court has presumed the constitutionality of student speech, subject
to proof by the state that the particular speech actually disrupts the school
routine. The cases that apply these standards share consistent themes; def-
erence to legislation designed to protect children from vulgar speech, and
suspicion of official claims that protected speech should be limited in school.
A. First Amendment Rights of Children
The leading Supreme Court decision regarding first amendment rights of
children is the 1968 case of Ginsberg v. New York.7 In Ginsberg, the Court
upheld the power of the state to forbid the sale of materials declared obscene
for children to minors, even though the materials were not obscene for
adults.' Because the magazines in Ginsberg were not obscene under adult
6. For example, in the area of negligence, the law recognizes the inability of children to
understand the consequences of their acts. Thus, the standard of contributory negligence for
children is stricter than it is for adults. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 180-81 (5th ed. 1983). In the area of contracts,
the common law holds that any contract into which a minor enters is voidable. The theory
behind this doctrine is that children lack the judgment and experience necessary to act in their
own best interests. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 232-33 (2d ed.
1977) (critical view of doctrine). In criminal law, children do not undergo criminal prosecution,
but instead undergo rehabilitative procedures within the juvenile justice system. See generally
Note, Where Have All The Children Gone?, supra note 3. Other age-based limitations are
evident in the Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (age requirement for
members of the House of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 3 (age requirement for
members of the Senate); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (voting age requirement).
7. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The case was decided along with Interstate Circuit Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968), which struck down on vagueness grounds an ordinance that
permitted city officials to enjoin the presentation of movies "not suitable for young persons."
8. 390 U.S. at 629-30. The state statute involved was N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney
1967) (current version at N.Y. Penal Law § 235.21 (McKinney 1980)). The New York statute
prohibits the sale to anyone under seventeen of any material that depicts nudity, sexual conduct,
or sado-masochistic abuse in a way that is harmful to minors. The statute also limits the
availability to minors of material containing "explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or
narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct, or sado-masochistic abuse . . . where
such material or its presentation is harmful to minors." Id. § 235.21(b).
As defined in the statute, "harmful to minors" uses the adult constitutional standard of
obscenity with modification for minors. Harmful to minors is defined as:
that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity,
19861
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standards, the first amendment protected the sale of these magazines to
adults. 9 Nevertheless, the Court held that a state may legislate a standard of
obscenity for minors that encompasses a greater range of erotic materials
than would be found obscene for adults.'0
The State of New York asserted two interests in support of its statute.
One interest was protecting the right of parents to limit their children's
access to sexual literature." The second interest was promoting the state's
"independent interest in the well-being of its youth."' 2 Although the state
sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it:
(a) Predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful, or morbid interest of minors;
(b) Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole
with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and
(c) Is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.
Id. § 235.20(b).
9. Adult obscenity standards were defined in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957),
and more recently in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Roth, the Supreme Court
defined obscenity as "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest."
354 U.S. at 484. The Roth Court also stated that "all ideas having even the slightest redeeming
social importance" are to be protected. Id.
In Miller, the Supreme Court expanded the definition of obscenity to include expression
which, while not without some social value, is regarded by the court as having no serious value.
413 U.S. at 19. The Court developed a three-part test for identifying material deemed as
obscene. Id. The test is:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards,"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interests ....
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
Id. (citations omitted).
10. 390 U.S. at 638. The Court stated that, "even where there is an invasion of protected
freedoms, 'the power of the State to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope
of its authority over adults."' Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
The variable obscenity concept was first described in Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censor-
ship: The Core Constitutional Issue-What is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1961). Dean
Lockhart and Professor McClure were concerned about varying obscenity laws to protect
immature children from the evils of pornography. See also Lockhart & McClure, Censorship
of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960), in which
the authors suggest that the Supreme Court should identify variable obscenity standards to
guide the lower courts.
11. 390 U.S. at 639.
12. Id. at 640. The Court held that the state has greater power to regulate the access of
children to sexually explicit materials than to regulate the conduct of adults. The Court
apparently found that the immaturity of minors and the state's interest in promoting morality
justify different rules. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 938-39 (1963).
The Supreme Court limits minors' rights in other constitutional areas, in view of the supposed
immaturity of children and their presumed inability to make choices in an intelligent, rational
and independent manner. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (preventive detention
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supplied no empirical support for its claim that exposure to erotic material
is harmful to children, the Supreme Court deferred to the state's finding of
a potential harm. 3
The Ginsberg decision is a narrow one because it permits regulation
directed at minors only if the material falls within the variable obscenity
standard. The decision does not support broad state restrictions on a minor's
access to written material. 4 Moreover, the New York statute challenged in
Ginsberg was narrowly drawn and only restricted material that presented
sexual conduct in a way that would be harmful to minors. The law was not
intended to suppress the conveyance of ideas to minors. 5
The variable obscenity standard introduced in Ginsberg was used again in
FCC v. Pacifica. ' 6 Pacifica involved a radio broadcast of George Carlin's
comic monologue "Filthy Words.' ' 7 In Pacifica, the Supreme Court allowed
the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) to sanction a radio station
for broadcasting "indecent" language at a time of day when children were
probably in the audience. The Court found the language in the "Filthy
Words" broadcast "patently offensive,"'" but not obscene. 9
of juveniles to protect child from own criminal tendencies is permissible); Ferber v. New York,
458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upheld laws prohibiting solicitation of children for pornography); H.L.
v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (sustained state statute requiring doctor to give parents notice
before performing abortion on minor); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (child's liberty
interest in not being held in state mental institution is "inextricably linked with the parents'
interest in and obligation for the welfare and health of the child"); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S.
132 (1976) (state can compel minor female to demonstrate that she has sufficient maturity and
competence to make decisions about her own abortions).
13. The Supreme Court used this same theory in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
There the Court held that a state may ban the distribution of matter depicting children engaged
in sexual activities, even though the material is not legally obscene under adult standards. The
Court relied on the state's compelling interest to prevent the sexual exploitation and abuse of
children who were photographed in producing such material. Id. at 750-55. As in Ginsberg,
the Ferber decision recognized the legitimate interest of the state in protecting children. Id. at
750-60.
14. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HAv. L. REv. 93, 127 (1968). The author concluded
that the variable obscenity standard, because of its vagueness, would be hard to apply in
practice. Id. at 130.
15. Id. at 127-28. The statute challenged in Ginsberg also attacked sales of "obscene"
material to children for profit. This attack is similar to the one made in Ferber, in which the
Supreme Court was concerned with the exploitation of children. See supra note 13.
16. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
17. Id. at 751-52. The offensive words in the broadcast were shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cock-
sucker, motherfucker and tits.
18. Id. at 731. The Court recognized that the "concept of 'indecent' is intimately connected
with the exposure of children to language that describes in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities
and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the
audience." Id. at 731-32 (citing In re Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1984)).
19. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 753 (2d ed. 1983). For
the first time, the Supreme Court reviewed the extent of the federal government's power to
prohibit radio speech because of its "offensive content."
19861
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The plurality opinion concluded that the FCC's interests in regulating the
broadcast exceeded the station's free speech interests in playing the mono-
logue. First, the Supreme Court found that listening children formed a
captive audience. 20 Because the broadcast entered the privacy of the home,
the minor audience was captive until they or their parents switched to another
station. Although the radio station warned listeners of the offensive nature
of the material, the Court found the privacy interest paramount. 2' Second,
the Court held that the federal government could constitutionally shield
young children from indecent speech. The FCC found that the early after-
noon broadcast of the monologue was easily accessible to children. 22 The
FCC did not claim that it could regulate indecent language at all times.
Instead, the FCC argued that the time of day was a reliable indicator for
determining the presence of children in the radio audience.
Although Pacifica was a plurality decision,23 the case significantly impacts
the area of minors' first amendment rights. The opinion balanced a broad-
caster's right to play profane or indecent language against the FCC's interest
in preventing undesirable influences on children. 24 By so doing, the Court
recognized that a child's first amendment right to receive information can
be limited because of the content of the information. Additionally, by holding
that the FCC can regulate programming to protect children in the radio
audience against indecent speech, the Court concluded that public broadcasts
are subject to special government restrictions.25 The Court explained that
because electronic broadcasters cannot screen their audience, the government
may limit the broadcast of certain types of adult programming to evening
hours. Five members of the Court agreed that the unique characteristics of
the broadcast media, along with the state's interest in protecting children
20. 438 U.S. at 748-49. As one of the reasons for restricting broadcast material, the Court
found that such material cannot be kept from children once it goes out over the airwaves. The




23. Justices Brennan and Marshall explicitly rejected the majority opinion of Justice Stevens,
stating that the kind of language involved was not of a lesser value than other speech and
therefore could not be regulated. Id. at 772 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Along with Justices
Brennan and Marshall, Justices Stewart and White dissented from the decision on statutory
grounds. Id. at 778-80 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The FCC's order was affirmed because the
concurring Justices, Powell and Blackmun, agreed that the order was necessary to protect
children from the broadcast material. Id. at 757 (Powell, J., concurring). Only Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist concurred with Justice Stevens' treatment of the constitutional
issues.
24. Id. at 748-49.
25. Id. at 749. In support of the FCC's decision to restrict "indecent" broadcast material,
the Court found that such material cannot be kept from children once it goes out over the
airwaves.
[Vol. 35:739
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and nonconsenting adults from offensive speech, justified the FCC's restric-
tion on the broadcast. 26
It is significant that the Pacifica plurality did not use a "strict scrutiny"
test in evaluating an administrative action that suppressed speech. 27 Freedom
of expression is a constitutionally protected right, and any restriction placed
on that right should be given strict scrutiny by the courts. 28 Strict scrutiny
requires that the state have a compelling interest in restricting the constitu-
tional right; however, the Pacifica Court allowed the FCC to sanction a
broadcaster without showing a compelling state interest. The sole purported
interest of the FCC was protecting children from indecent broadcasting. 29
The Pacifica Court balanced the value of the content of publicly broadcast
speech against the harm that the speech might cause to children who hear
it.30 This balancing approach is similar to the analysis used in Ginsberg.
Both decisions conclude that children have a first amendment right to receive
information, but that the state has the power to restrict that right in certain
limited instances.3 1
26. Id. at 750, 762 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell's concurring opinion described
the unique characteristics of the broadcast medium:
During most of the broadcast hours, both adults and unsupervised children are
likely to be in the broadcast audience, and the broadcaster cannot reach willing
adults without also reaching children. This, as the Court emphasizes, is one of the
distinctions between the broadcast and other media to which we often have adverted
as justifying a different treatment of the broadcast media for first amendment
purposes.
A second difference, not without relevance, is that broadcasting-unlike most
other forms of communication-comes directly into the home, the one place where
people ordinarily have the right not to be assaulted by uninvited and offensive
sights and sounds.
Id. at 758-59 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
27. Note, Pacifica's Seven Dirty Words: A Sliding Scale of the First Amendment, 1979 U.
ILL. L.F. 969, 995.
28. The Supreme Court established a strict scrutiny test for state legislation that interferes
with enjoyment of fundamental, constitutionally protected rights. The strict scrutiny test involves
a two-level review: 1) the state's objective behind the statutory scheme must be compelling, and
2) the scheme employed must be necessary to achieve the objective. See, e.g., Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 530 (1981) (strict scrutiny of state's refusal to allow religious group to meet
on state school campus); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (strict scrutiny
of city ordinance prohibiting non-commercial billboards); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (strict scrutiny of state law restricting right to vote); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (strict scrutiny of state welfare residency requirements);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (strict scrutiny of law discriminating on basis
of race).
29. 438 U.S. at 749-50. In citing Ginsberg, the Pacifica Court held that the state's interest
in protecting children justified the special treatment given language considered indecent. Id.
Some scholars argue that Pacifica waters down the variable obscenity standard. See Gard &
Endress, The Impact of Pacifica Foundation on Two Traditions of Freedom of Expression, 27
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 465, 479-80 (1978).
30. Id. at 744-50.
31. See also Konigsberg v. California State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting)
19861
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B. First Amendment Rights of Children
Within the Public School System
Two Supreme Court decisions have addressed students' freedom of expres-
sion in school.32 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District33 dealt with a direct infringement of high school students' right to
speech. Board of Education v. Pico3 4 addressed the rights of students to
receive information in a high school library. Both decisions affirmed the
first amendment rights of students, but, in dicta, accorded school adminis-
trators broad discretion to limit student speech.
The Tinker Court held that a public school district could not bar junior
high and high school students from wearing armbands as a protest against
the war in Vietnam. In Tinker, the school authorities adopted a rule that
banned the wearing of black armbands and called for the suspension of
students who violated the rule.35 The Court stated that the wearing of
armbands was akin to pure speech36 and therefore was entitled to first
amendment protection.37 Nevertheless, the Court did not grant high school
(speech can be regulated when aimed not at content, but at "incidental" abridgment); Black
& Kahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 549, 559 (1962) ("Freedom of speech means that you shall not do something to people
either for the views they have or the views they express or the words they speak or write").
32. Children have first amendment rights in the public school, but the rights are limited.
The history of the constitutional rights of children within the public school setting can be traced
to two Supreme Court decisions from the 1920's. First, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), the Supreme Court held a Nebraska law invalid that prohibited the teaching of German
to students below the level of eighth grade. In Meyer, the Court found that the Nebraska
statute did not promote the interest of the state to produce civic-minded children. Id. at 402.
Second, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 286 U.S. 510 (1925), the Supreme Court held that an
Oregon law that required children between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public school
was unconstitutional. The Pierce Court held that the government's interest in improving the
development of children did not warrant the abolition of private education. Id. at 534. Both
Meyer and Pierce are cited in present-day cases to support the constitutional rights of students
within public schools. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969). However, neither decision presented any theory about the free speech
rights of public school students. The Meyer and Pierce Courts focused on the rights of parents
to control the education of their children. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
33. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
34. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
35. 393 U.S. at 504.
36. Id. at 505. The Court occasionally distinguishes between pure speech and speech
connected with conduct. Government regulation is justified in a case where conduct, as opposed
to speech, is regulated. Compare Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (upholding statute
barring picketing of courthouse) with West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943) (refusal to salute flag akin to pure speech). The cases suggest that the distinction
between pure speech and speech connected with conduct is a legal fiction. According to Professor
Tribe, this distinction "must be seen at best as announcing a conclusion of the Court, rather
than as summarizing in any way the analytic processes which led the Court to that conclusion."
L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 600.
37. 393 U.S. at 506.
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students unlimited license to protest the war. The Court held that if a
student's chosen form of expression substantially disrupted the operation of
a school, then school officials could constitutionally suppress the speech.3"
The Tinker Court found that some administrative control over student speech
might be necessary to keep peace and order in the school.3 9 A significant
factor in the Tinker case was that the school authorities' action was not
based on a peace and order interest, but on a desire to preclude any protest
of the Vietnam War.40 The Court held the school authorities' action uncon-
stitutional because there was no evidence that the presence of armbands
substantially interfered with the school's activities.
4
'
The Tinker decision offers insight into how the Supreme Court compares
freedom of speech to the peace and order interests of public school admin-
istrators. First, the Court found that free speech helps young people prepare
for citizenship in a democratic society.4 2 Freedom of student expression is
important in developing children's social awareness and citizenship.4 3 Second,
the Court found that school administrators have no legitimate interest in
punishing students simply for their political speech. 44
The first amendment rights of children in public schools were again at
issue in Board of Education v. Pico.41 In this case, the Supreme Court set
constitutional limits on the authority of public school boards to remove
books from a school library. The school board in a small, upstate New York
community ordered that nine books be removed from school libraries. 6 The
38. Id. at 513-14. The Court also stated:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of a
particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused
by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.
Id. at 509.
39. Id. at 507.
40. Id. at 510.
41. Id. at 514. The Court's central concern in Tinker was that students should not be
confined in their expression only to those expressions and opinions approved by the school
board. Id. at 511.
42. Id. at 512-13. See Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 Tax. L. REv. 321,
338 (1979). Justice Fortas' majority opinion in Tinker recognized the child's claim to free speech
rights to be the same as adults, subject only to the unique environmental limitations of the
school. "First amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students." 393 U.S. at 506.
43. 393 U.S. at 506 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
44. Berkman, Students in Court: Free Speech and the Functions of Schooling in America,
40 HARv. EDuc. REv. 567, 580-81 (1970).
45. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
46. Id. at 856 n.3. A committee was appointed to review eleven books located in the school
district's libraries. The school board suspected that the books were improper for its students.
Id. at 856-57. The committee consisted of four parents and four members of the school staff.
The committee held that five books should be retained, two books should be removed, and
19861
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asserted justification for the removal was that the books were "anti-Amer-
ican, anti-Semitic, anti-Christian, and filthy." '47 The Supreme Court found
that a school board may not remove books from a library if the removal is
motivated by a political or partisan desire to deny students access to ideas.4 1
Although the Pico decision appears to reinforce students' first amendment
rights, the holding was a plurality opinion, with limited precedential value. 49
Furthermore, dicta in the plurality opinion concludes that school districts
may generally regulate the holdings of libraries if the material is found to
be indecent, vulgar or otherwise educationally unsuitable.50 The standard
developed in Pico, therefore, focuses on the motivation of school authori-
ties."1 The Court developed the standard to balance the interest of the state
one book should be available to students with the consent of parents. Id. at 857-58. The five
books recommended to be retained were Best Short Stories by Negro Writers (L. Hughes ed.
1967); R. Wright, Black Boy (1945); Anonymous, Go Ask Alice (1976); 0. LaFarge, Laughing
Boy (1929); and B. Malamud, The Fixer (1966). Id. at 858 n.5. The two books recommended
to be removed were P. Thomas, Down These Mean Streets (1969), and D. Morris, The Naked
Ape (1967). Id. at 858 n.6. K. Vonnegut, Jr., Slaughterhouse Five (1968) was recommended to
be made available to students only with parental approval. Id. at 858 n.9. The committee could
not agree on the removal of two books: A. Childress, A Hero Ain't Nothin' but a Sandwich
(1973), and E. Cleaver, Soul On Ice (1968). Id. at 858 n.7. No action was taken on A Reader
for Writers (J. Archer ed. 1971), because not all members of the committee were able to read
the book. Id. at 858 n.8.
The school board ignored the committee's recommendations and ordered nine of the books
removed from the school district libraries. Id. The nine books ordered removed were Best Short
Stories by Negro Writers, A Hero Ain't Nothin' but a Sandwich, Soul On Ice, Go Ask Alice,
The Naked Ape, Down These Mean Streets, Slaughterhouse Five, A Reader for Writers, and
The Fixer. Id. Laughing Boy was to be returned to the library, and Black Boy was to be made
available to students with parental consent. Id. at 858 nn.10 & 11.
47. Id. at 857.
48. Id. at 871.
49. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens upheld the students' first amendment
right by limiting the authority of the school board to remove books from school libraries.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Conner dissented in the decision
and held that students' first amendment rights did not place any limitation on the authority of
the school board to remove library books. Id. at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The critical
dissent of Justice Rehnquist argued that students have no right of access to ideas in school.
Id. at 904 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated that public education is inculcative
and is properly selective in its choice of acceptable subject matter. Id. at 909-10. Justice White
concurred in the opinion, but concluded that the plurality should not have addressed the first
amendment issues until findings of fact and conclusions of law were made at a trial on the
merits. Id. at 883 (White, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 871. For an example of how this idea works in practice, see Bicknell v. Vergennes
Union High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals held that school officials did not violate students' first amendment rights by removing
books on the basis of the vulgarity and indecency of language contained therein.
The Pico decision does not reveal whether the "vulgarity" standard is encompassed by the
standard of indecent speech announced in Pacifica or the variable obscenity standard announced
in Ginsberg. Rush, supra note 3, at 477.
51. 457 U.S. at 871. The Court held that if the school board removed the library books to
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to inculcate students with community values with the students' first amend-
ment rights.12
The Pico decision illuminates the Supreme Court's views about the pur-
poses of public education. The Pico Court recognized that the primary
function of public schools is to socialize students, 3 but separated the function
of libraries from this purpose and concluded that libraries provide a unique
source of self-enrichment for students.5 4 In the past, the Court has recognized
that meaningful freedom of speech entailed a listener's right to hear the
speaker's communications." The Pico decision extended this concept by
stating that a listener has an independent first amendment right of access to
communication.16 The Court reasoned that students have a first amendment
right to receive information, and that this right extends to the school library.
To remove books from a school library deprives students of their first
amendment right of access to information.17
Pico, like Tinker, affirms the student's right to receive information in
school. Despite that principle, the two Courts gave different weight to first
amendment rights in public schools. The Tinker Court recognized that public
schools serve as a free marketplace of ideas.5 8 In contrast, the Pico Court
observed that public schools principally inculcate ideas approved by the
community. The Court in Pico cautioned federal district courts not to
intervene in public school controversies unless a school district's action
directly and sharply implicates basic constitutional values. 9
deprive students of access to ideas with which the school board disagreed, the removal would
be unconstitutional. Id. In book removal situations, school authorities cannot remove books
to suppress ideas, even though school boards traditionally exercise broad discretion over the
management affairs of local schools. Id. at 859, 863. Among the first amendment rights enjoyed
by students, according to Justice Brennan, is the right to receive ideas. Id. at 867.
52. Id. at 864-66.
53. Id. at 864 (citing Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
54. Id. at 868-69. The Court held that voluntary inquiry is an important part of the students'
education and should be left as free as is reasonably possible.
55. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409 (1974); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564-65 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480-83 (1965).
56. 457 U.S. at 868. Pico was the first Supreme Court decision to uphold students' rights
to receive information. In support of this position, the Court relied on precedent giving that
right to adults. Id. at 867 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster
Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)).
57. Id. at 868 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
58. 393 U.S. at 868. Other Supreme Court decisions recognize different constitutional rights
which students retain within the school context. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651
(1977) (corporal punishment in public schools affects constitutionally protected liberty interest,
although due process does not require notice and opportunity to be heard prior to punishment);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (ten-day suspension of student required to meet standards
of due process); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (state may
not require flag salute and recitation of pledge of allegiance as part of receiving public
education).
59. 457 U.S. at 864-66. See also Rush, supra note 3, at 474-75 (although Court in Pico
recognized students' first amendment rights, Court did not deny school board authority to
remove 'vulgar, although not obscene' books from library).
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
The contrast between the Tinker and Pico decisions becomes evident when
examining two aspects of the opinions. First, the burden of proof shifted
between the cases from the school to the students. Both Courts emphasized
that local school boards and school officials possess broad authority over
the public schools6° and balanced the school's interest in peace and order
against the student's right to free expression. 61 In Tinker, the Court gave
the first amendment right of students special deference by placing the burden
on the state to show that black armbands substantially disrupted the edu-
cational process. 62 In contrast, the Pico Court gave undue deference to the
state. 63 In Pico, the Court effectively placed the burden of persuasion on
the students to show that school authorities had an unconstitutional motive
when they removed the books from the library.6
Tinker and Pico also applied different standards of review to the consti-
tutional legitimacy of the school's suppression of student speech. The Tinker
Court used a substantial disruption standard. 65 Under Tinker, school admin-
istrators can regulate expression on school property only if the speech causes
a substantial disruption in the maintenance of discipline within the school.6
The Pico Court apparently used a lower standard than "substantial disrup-
tion" in reviewing the school board's administrative actions. Under Pico, as
long as the official decision is free of motives to suppress ideas or to promote
political orthodoxy, school districts may regulate the contents of school
libraries on any rational basis. 67 The conflicting standards found in Pico and
Tinker obscure the appropriate standard for reviewing suppression of student
speech in school. 61
60. Pico, 457 U.S. at 870; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
61. See supra notes 37-40, 47, 50-51 and accompanying text.
62. 393 U.S. at 509.
63. 457 U.S. at 864-69. Quoting the school board's brief, the Court agreed "that local
school boards must be permitted 'to establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as to
transmit community values' and that 'there is a legitimate and substantial community interest
in promoting respect for authority and traditional values, be they social, moral, or political."'
Id. at 864.
64. Rush, supra note 3, at 477 n.105. Even if the burden of proving an unconstitutional
motive is overcome, the students' rights are still not absolute. Removal of present library books
was distinguished from the acquisition of new library books. The decision in Pico did not affect
"in any way the discretion of a local school board to choose books to add to the libraries of
their schools." 457 U.S. at 871. In book removal situations, physical space limitation may
justify the removal of various books. Id. at 875. Justice Blackmun, concurring in part in the
decision in Pico, recognized three circumstances where removal should be allowed: 1) when a
copy of the book is worn out, 2) when the book is obsolete, or 3) when the shelf space is
limited. Id. at 879-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun also noted that if a book
is "psychologically or intellectually inappropriate for the age group, school authorities should
be allowed to remove it." Id. at 877.
65. See supra note 38.
66. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
68. Rush, supra note 3, at 485-86.
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II. THE FACTS OF FRASER
Matthew N. Fraser was a seventeen-year-old high school senior at Bethel
High School, the only secondary school in the Bethel School District in
Tacoma, Washington.69 On April 26, 1983, Fraser gave a campaign speech
at a student assembly on behalf of a candidate for student body vice-
president. The assembly took place during school hours, but attendance was
voluntary. Students not wishing to participate in the assembly could attend
a study period in the library. About six hundred students attended the
program.70 Fraser's speech was laced with sexual innuendo:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt,
his character is firm-but most of all, his belief in you, the students of
Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary,
he'll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in
spurts-he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally-he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each
and every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for ASB vice president-he'll never come between you
and the best our high school can be. 71
The students reacted boisterously to the speech. Some students "hooted
and yelled," one student simulated masturbation, and two students simulated
sexual intercourse by moving their hips.7 2 One teacher testified that the day
after Fraser's speech, students expressed so much interest that she devoted
approximately ten minutes of class time to discuss his speech. 73
The day after the speech, the assistant principal of Bethel High School
charged Fraser with violating the school's disruptive conduct rule. 74 After a
hearing, the school suspended Fraser for three days and removed his name
from an approved list of candidates for graduation speaker. 75 After exhaust-
ing local administrative remedies, Fraser and his father filed a civil rights
action against the school district in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington. The district court issued a declaratory
69. 755 F.2d 1356, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985).
70. Id. at 1360.
71. Id. at 1357.
72. Id. at 1359.
73. Id. at 1360.
74. The rule appears in the student handbook. It states:
In addition to the criminal acts defined above, the commission of, or participation
in certain non-criminal activities or acts may lead to disciplinary action. Generally,
these are acts which disrupt and interfere with the educational process . . ..
Disruptive conduct. Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with
the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language
or gestures.
Id. at 1357 n.I.
75. Id.
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judgment, finding that the school district had violated Fraser's rights under
the Civil Rights Act and the first and fourteenth amendments of the Con-
stitution.76 The district court also ordered the school district to allow Fraser
to participate in Bethel High School's commencement exercises as a gradu-
ation speaker. Finally, the court awarded Fraser damages, costs, and attor-
neys' fees. 7" The school district appealed the district court's decision.
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S RATIONALE
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court on constitutional grounds alone. Because the school district
did not assert that Fraser's speech was obscene, the court concluded that
the school could justify disciplining Fraser only if his speech caused sub-
stantial disruption of the school routine or if the speech invaded the rights
of others. The court applied the Tinker standard and held that the school
district failed to prove that Fraser's speech was a substantial disruption. The
court found that Fraser's speech evoked a lively and noisy response from
the students.78 This response was perceived as ordinary for a high school
assembly.7 9
The court also addressed the captive audience concerns raised by Pacifica
and considered whether the audience of Fraser's speech was similar to the
minor audience of the broadcast in Pacifica. First, the court concluded that
there was no legitimate interest in privacy in a school assembly hall.80 Second,
the court reasoned that high school students are not impressionable young
people who need protection from crude speech as did the potential listeners
in Pacifica."' Third, the court found that the assembly audience was not
captive, because students were free to leave the assembly and attend a study
hall. 2 Fourth, the court stated that Fraser's speech was outside the school's
legitimate authority to regulate the curriculum. Although the court acknowl-
edged that school officials have broad discretion to control educational
curricula, the court found that Fraser's speech was not part of Bethel High
76. Id. at 1358.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1362. Because students have a first amendment right of expression in school, the
court rejected two arguments made by the school district in support of its disciplinary action.
The court first rejected the claim that the district could discipline Fraser because the nominating
speech had a disruptive effect on the educational process of the school. Id. at 1360. Second,
the court found that the school district's interest in maintaining a level of civility at the school
did not outweigh Fraser's freedom of expression. Id.
79. Id. at 1362.
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School's curriculum at all. 3 The speech was nothing more than speech
between students, which a school may not regulate in the name of curriculum.
The dissenting judge argued that the majority undervalued the authority
of school officials to enforce standards of decency in public schools., 4 The
dissent relied on the Pico Court's admonition that federal courts should not
intervene in school affairs unless the school disregards basic constitutional
rights of students. 5 The dissent discerned no constitutional violations in
Fraser's case.16 Finally, the dissent claimed that the majority misapplied the
Tinker "substantial disruption" standard. According to the dissent, the
Tinker standard allows a school district to regulate expression that would
ordinarily be expected to disrupt students.17 The dissent also concluded that
Fraser's speech was in fact disruptive and harmful. The dissenting judge
explained that the speech could be shocking, embarrassing, or detrimental
to the students.88
IV. TrE SUPEME COURT's RATIONALE
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser.9 The Court held that Fraser's free speech
and due process rights were not violated. It concluded that the school district
did not unconstitutionally exceed the bounds of its disciplinary authority by
suspending Fraser "in response to his offensively lewd and indecent speech.'' 9
The Court found it to be truly the work of the school board to determine
what manner of speech in the classroom is inappropriate.91 Furthermore,
Fraser's due process rights were not violated because two days' suspension
"does not rise to the level of a penal sanction calling for the full panopoly
83. The court stated, "The assembly, which was run by a student, was a voluntary activity
in which students were invited to give their own speeches, not speeches prescribed by school
authorities as part of the educational program." Id.
The speech did not take place during class. Accordingly, the Bethel School District's reliance
on Pico was misplaced. As Justice Brennan said in the Pico decision, school boards may not
"extend their claim of absolute discretion beyond the compulsory environment of the classroom,
into the school library and the regime of voluntary inquiry that there holds sway." 457 U.S.
at 869. Moreover, a student-run election assembly is even further removed from the "compulsory
environment of the classroom" than a library. 755 F.2d at 1364 (citing Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982)).
84. 755 F.2d at 1368 (Wright, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1366 (Wright, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1367 (Wright, J., dissenting). The dissent focused on the physical confinement
of schools, the immaturity of the audience that heard the speech, and the school's interest in
promoting citizenship, discipline and morality.
87. Id. at 1364 (Wright, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1365 (Wright, J., dissenting).
89. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
90. Id. at 3166.
91. Id. at 3165.
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of procedural due process protections. ' 92 The Court found that Fraser had
adequate warning that his speech could subject him to sanctions. 9
V. ANALYSIS OF THE FRASER DECISIONS
The court of appeals decided, as did Tinker, that school officials could
not regulate a student's speech to other students without proof that the
expression substantially disrupted or materially interfered with the educa-
tional process. 94 The speech was not obscene by either adult standards95 or
the Ginsberg variable standard.9 6 High school students are approaching the
age of majority, and the need to protect them against offensive speech is
less compelling than is the need to protect young children against sexually
related magazines. 97 Fraser's speech was innocuous compared to the content
of the Penthouse magazines suppressed by Ginsberg. Thus, the Ginsberg
standard could not be extended to warrant suppression of a speech like
Fraser's. 98
92. Id. at 3166.
93. Id.
94. 755 F.2d at 1361. The Tinker decision recognized that students are entitled to express
their views freely, absent a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate student
speech. 393 U.S. at 511.
95. See supra note 9.
96. See supra notes 10 & 13 and accompanying text.
97. The age and maturity of students in the audience must be considered to determine the
breadth of students' first amendment rights. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring).
98. On the other hand, the Ginsberg Court found that the state can regulate the sale of
sexually explicit material to children in order to protect the interests of parents, many of whom
do not want their children to see such material. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40
(1968). Apparently, high school authorities can regulate access to sexually explicit material in
their in loco parentis capacity. If the school wanted to suppress Fraser's speech on this basis,
the content of Fraser's speech would have to be comparable to the magazines deemed obscene
for children in Ginsberg. The statute involved in Ginsberg prohibited the sale of erotic materials
to those under seventeen years of age. On a factual basis, Fraser's speech was not erotic in the
same sense that the magazines were in Ginsberg; it was certainly not explicit. The speech
probably would be protected under Ginsberg.
Furthermore, the statute in Ginsberg withstood the constitutional challenge because the
government invoked other public policy interests. The statute banned the sale of erotic materials
to children; the state's interest was to condemn the sale for profit of such material to children.
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 750-69 (1982) (state has strong interest in preventing
sexual exploitation of children for profit). In Fraser, however, the speech had no underlying
profit motive. Therefore, although the Fraser Court did not address whether the speech was
obscene based on the standards set forth in Roth, Miller and Ginsberg, the speech was not
obscene.
The Supreme Court in Fraser addresses the in loco parentis concept. 106 S. Ct. at 3165.
However, the Court fails to distinguish between harm caused by explicit sexual materials sold
to minors and an inappropriate speech at a high school assembly. The Court also failed to
address the limitations of in loco parentis announced in earlier decisions. See infra note 114.
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The Supreme Court's decision in Fraser is puzzling because it characterizes
the sexual connotations in the speech as "lewd and obscene" without defining
the meaning of those words. 99 Based on prior decisions of the Court in the
area of students' first amendment rights, this use of "lewd and obscene"
must be clarified in order to avoid confusion in the law. The Court avoided
the issue of whether the speech was obscene under Ginsberg's variable
obscenity standard or whether a new obscenity standard is applicable to
school situations. Procedurally, the difference as to the characterization of
obscenity is critical. Under the variable obscenity standard, if the student
can show that the speech is not harmful, then the speech is not subject to
regulation. By using the conclusory "lewd and obscene" language, the Court
created a new standard for regulating students' first amendment rights. Under
this new standard, school officials can regulate speech regardless of its
harmful effect.
The Supreme Court also concluded that the possible embarrassment caused
by Fraser's speech could be seriously damaging to a high school audience.1°°
Such a conclusion is erroneous for two reasons. First, the evidence did not
prove that there was any serious harm as a result of Fraser's speech. Second,
there was no evidence that Fraser's speech had the potential for substantial
harm. Unlike the immature audience in Ginsberg, Fraser's audience was
more mature and, therefore, less in need of protection. 10 1
Since Fraser's speech did not come within the variable obscenity test set
forth in Ginsberg, the court of appeals correctly reached the question of
whether the speech disrupted the school's routine.102 As established in Tinker,
students have a fundamental right to freedom of expression. 103 Because
freedom of expression is a fundamental right, even in school, the Fraser
court properly placed a high burden on the state to justify suppressing the
speech. '04
The state failed to prove that Fraser's speech was substantially disruptive.
The court of appeals did not acknowledge such intangible disruptions as the
embarrassment that some students might have felt after hearing the speech.
99. 106 S. Ct. at 3163.
100. Id. at 3165.
101. The Supreme Court stated that Fraser's speech could be seriously damaging to a less
mature audience. Id. However, given today's fast-paced society, it is doubtful that fourteen-
year-old high school students are unaware of human sexuality.
102. See Tushnet, Free Expression and the Young Adult: A Constitutional Framework, 1976
U. ILL. L.F. 746. Professor Tushnet states that the first amendment rights of children need the
most protection in school, because of the length of time children spend there. Id. at 747.
103. Tinker states that students "do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 393 U.S. at 506. See supra note 58 and accompanying
text. If anything, Fraser's speech deserves greater first amendment protection than the conduct
in Tinker, because it is pure speech and not speech mixed with conduct. With pure speech,
punishment for past speech is not justified where substantial disruption did not occur. Karp v.
Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 176 (9th Cir. 1973).
104. See Tushnet, supra note 102, at 750.
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Nevertheless, the court followed Tinker and limited its review to physical
disruption. 05 The school sought to punish Fraser for a speech that he had
already given. To justify the punishment, the school district had to prove
that Fraser's speech in fact substantially disrupted the school's routine.
Nonetheless, the testimony showed that the students' reaction to Fraser's
speech was modest. The hooting, yelling and sexually suggestive movements
of the students could be expected by school authorities at a political assembly
that was run for students by other students. Additionally, the ten-minute
discussion of Fraser's speech in class the next day could be viewed as a
healthy exchange of ideas, not a substantial disruption.
The analysis applied by the appellate court was rejected by the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court never addressed the lack of physical disruption
caused by Fraser's speech and, in fact, only discussed potential non-physical
harm that the speech might create."06 The Supreme Court discussed the
bewilderment and mimicry of other students as a result of the speech, but
failed to equate these with the substantial disruption standard of Tinker.
An argument made by the school district in Fraser was that the students
at the assembly were a captive audience. 0 " For this argument, the school
district heavily relied on Pacifica. "I The court of appeals concluded that
Pacifica's captive audience doctrine did not apply at the assembly. Pacifica
was narrowly restricted to indecent expression broadcast into the privacy of
a home.' °9 A high school assembly is not a private place." 0 The students at
the assembly did not have the same expectation of privacy that the listeners
in Pacifica did.
In addition, unlike the young, impressionable children in the audience for
the Pacifica broadcast, Fraser's speech was made to high school seniors,
individuals on the threshold of adulthood.' Fraser's classmates needed far
105. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
106. 106 S. Ct. at 3165. The Court stated that Fraser's speech "could well be seriously
damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the
threshold of awareness of human sexuality." Id.
107. 755 F.2d at 1361-62.
108. Id. at 1361-63.
109. 438 U.S. at 750. The Pacifica Court identified these factors that should weigh in the
FCC's decision to sanction indecent broadcasts: 1) the time of the broadcast; 2) the type of
broadcast (public or closed circuit); and 3) the context of the indecent speech. Pacifica
distinguished sharply between regulation of ideas and regulation of expressive language. Id. at
746 n.22. Again, the Court is addressing the unique nature of broadcasting.
110. 755 F.2d at 1362.
111. The Supreme Court uses the maturity of minors as one measure by which to weigh
minor's rights. One potent example is abortion: a minor can get an abortion without parental
consent if she can persuade a court that she is mature enough to make an informed decision.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979). A maturity standard, even if objective, would be
impracticable or impossible to administer. Because the age of Fraser's audience ranged from
teenagers to adults, only offensive speech bordering on the obscene could be suppressed
constitutionally.
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less protection from sexual innuendo than did the young children in Pacifica.
The high school students were free to stay at the assembly or to go to a
study hall.11 2 No person offended by Fraser's speech had to remain at the
assembly.
The school district also relied on Pico to argue that school officials may
control the school's curriculum, and by extension, the content of school-
sponsored assemblies." 3 This construction of the school's authority to shape
a curriculum is too broad. A curriculum is a pedagogical agenda; schools
and school districts may lecture to students, choose books, assign lessons,
and grade students according to any rational plan of education." 4 The Pico
Court decided that a school curriculum is generally not subject to first
amendment review." 5 The Pico Court also recognized that many speech
activities in the school could not be constitutionally restricted unless the
speech is "indecent, vulgar, or educationally unsuitable.""' 6 For example,
112. 755 F.2d at 1364.
113. Id. at 1361. As part of the district's argument that the assembly was a school-run event,
the district stated that the student government was a "formal organization of the students of
the school formed with the approval of and regulation by the board of directors of the school
district ..... Id. at 1363 n.ll (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.115 (1982)).
114. J. SAYLOR & W. ALEXANDER, CURRICULUM PLANNING FOR MODERN SCHOOLS 126-27
(1966). Several of the functions of public schools relate to the intellectual and emotional growth
of the child. Schools help assess the "determination of individual talents, capabilities, and
abilities; ... development of individual potentialities; ... transmission of the cultural heritage;
discovery and systemization of knowledge; and development of character." Id. Another function
of a public school is to inculcate values that provide "educational experiences that give pupils
an understanding of the values, mores, and traditions of society, and that will ensure adherence
to these values in behavior." Id. at 127. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1976)
(public schools vitally important as vehicles for inculcating fundamental values necessary to
maintenance of democratic system). Schools also prepare children for adulthood. See Diamond,
The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEAx. L.
REv. 477, 497-500 (1981) (primary function of public education is to-indoctrinate students with
values of society); see also Orleans, What Johnny Can't Read: "First Amendment Rights" in
the Classroom, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 5-9 (1981) (students' first amendment rights conflict with
effective curriculum administration); Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public
School Teachers to Determine What they Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1343, 1350-54 (1976)
(school's interest in inculcating ideas conflicts with "marketplace of ideas" conception of first
amendment).
Some argument is made that schools have in loco parentis authority to control speech. In
loco parentis status legally delegates to a non-parent a parent's control over a child. In loco
parentis was recently rejected by the Supreme Court as a basis for limiting the rights of high
schools students under the fourth amendment. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 740-41
(1985). Cf. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975) (because parental rights involved
are not fundamental, state may corporally punish child).
115. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. See also Freeman, The Supreme Court and
First Amendment Rights of Students in the Public School Classroom: A Proposed Model of
Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 45 n.284 (1984):
[T]here is little doubt that a right of access conflicts with the inculcative function.
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Justice Brennan noted in Pico that "the special characteristics of the school
library make that environment especially appropriate for the recognition of
the first amendment rights of students.""' 7 The major concern reflected in
Pico was that school board authorities might indoctrinate students in matters
of politics, religion and related areas."'
The school assembly setting in Fraser can legitimately be compared to the
library in Pico. The students at the assembly were invited to give their own
speeches, not speeches prescribed by school authorities. This situation is
analogous to entering a school library to seek out knowledge. Moreover,
attendance at the assembly in Fraser, like the use of a library in Pico, was
not compulsory. Therefore, Fraser should have had greater freedom to
express himself at the school assembly than he would have had within the
classroom. Moreover, the political nature of the assembly and the freedom
given to the speakers at that assembly were completely outside the normal
curriculum. 19
Unless courts are willing to review curriculum decisions systematically, school
officials have virtually uncontrolled discretion to determine the general curriculum
and to determine the content of individual courses. These decisions inevitably provide
access to some ideas and beliefs while denying access to others. A decision to
eliminate classical languages from the curriculum denies access to information. A
decision not to add a course in Asian history restricts the free flow of information.
These content-based decisions presumably represent an informed decision that some
types of information are more valuable than others. Such decisions are common-
place, and the authority of school officials to make them is almost universally
accepted. Some critics of the decision may disagree because of educational concerns,
but rarely will they argue that a constitutional right has been violated.
Id. at 46-47.
117. 457 U.S. at 868. Justice Brennan noted that a school library should aid student inquiry
into areas not covered by the prescribed curriculum. Id. at 869. He also distinguished the school
library from areas where the inculcative function of school authorities exists, by stating that
school authorities may claim:
absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate
community values . . . .That duty is misplaced where ...they attempt to extend
their claim of absolute discretion beyond the compulsory environment of the
classroom, into the school library and the regime of voluntary inquiry that there
holds sway.
Id.
118. Id. at 870-71. This concern was expressed in light of Justice Brennan's statement that
"local school boards have a substantial legitimate role to play in the determination of school
library content." Id. at 869. Justice Brennan stated that students should not be regarded as
closed-circuit recipients of the limited range of views that the state chooses to communicate.
Id. at 868 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). He also quoted
Justice Jackson's admonishment that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion." 457 U.S. at 870
(quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). Justice
Brennan also noted that "the First Amendment . . .does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom ...." 457 U.S. at 870 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
119. Fraser testified that he knowingly used sexual innuendo in his speech. 755 F.2d at 1363.
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The Supreme Court's opinion appears to have misinterpreted the facts of
Fraser. The Court found that the political assembly was part of a school-
sponsored educational program in self-government. 120 Implying that the as-
sembly was within the educative function of the Bethel School District, the
Court found that the school's decision was not related to a political view-
point. 12' Fraser's speech was given in a political arena, in order to help elect
his candidate. This is a setting outside the normal classroom environment.
Although the speech was not expounding a political viewpoint, it was given
in a political context. Whether Tinker has now been overruled, by interpre-
tation if not declaration, is for future courts to determine. The Supreme
Court's holding in Fraser does not properly address the findings of the lower
court and, as a result, has left unclear whether students have first amendment
rights while at school. It is difficult to determine exactly what the Supreme
Court is trying to protect against in this case. 1
22
VI. PROPOSED MODEL FOR EXAMINING STUDENTS' RIGHTS
To remedy the confusion generated by the Supreme Court's decision in
Fraser, this Note proposes a model for examining students' first amendment
rights. By systematically applying the standards set out by the Supreme Court
in its previous decisions, the proposed model provides school officials with
a four-step methodology for determining what speech may be constitutionally
regulated within the public schools.
The first step is to decide whether the speech is obscene by adult standards.
If the expression "appeals to the prurient interests" or "describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct," and "lacks serious literary, artistic,
Once Fraser's speech took place in the political arena, suppression of that speech would
unconstitutionally deny Fraser his right to convey his political ideas in getting his candidate
elected. Based on Fraser's testimony, he gave his speech because of its intended political impact.
A political statement often contains provocative statements to gain the attention of an audience.
120. 106 S. Ct. at 3162. The Court concludes that there is a marked distinction between the
political symbol in Tinker and the sexual innuendo used by Fraser. Id. at 3163. As support for
this conclusion, the Court noted that the use of the armband in Tinker did not intrude on the
rights of the school or other students. Id. However, there was no evidence in Fraser indicating
that Fraser's speech caused substantial disruption of the educational process. As Justice Marshall
stated in his dissenting opinion, "The school district failed to demonstrate that respondent's
remarks were indeed disruptive." Id. at 3168 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan once again recognized that students do not
give up their constitutional rights when they go to school. Id. at 3167. Fraser's speech could
only be suppressed if it were harmful to other students or if it disrupted the school's processes.
Id.
Justice Brennan held that Fraser's speech was not harmful to other students, id. at 3168
n.2., but it did disrupt the educational mission. Id. at 3168. In reaching his decision, Justice
Brennan recognized a school's interest in teaching proper civil discourse. Id. However, such
analysis fails to give weight to a school's interest in teaching the precepts of the first amendment.
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or scientific value," the speech is obscene.'2 3 Obscene speech may be regulated
for adults and children.
If the speech is not obscene by adult standards, the second step is to
determine the age of the audience. This is derived from the Ginsberg variable
obscenity standard. The age and maturity of possible onlookers are taken
into account to measure the potential harm caused by the speech. 21 If there
might be young children in the audience, the state may presume that indecent
or vulgar speech will be harmful to that part of the audience. The variable
obscenity standard restricts more speech if the audience contains young
children, but allows greater liberty in a speech addressed at children close
to majority. A speech directed at young children may be classified as vulgar
or obscene within the variable obscenity standard, while the same speech
directed at older students may escape such classification.
Third, if the speech is classified as not obscene under the variable obscenity
standard, then the school may limit the time, place, and manner of the
speech. Because public school classrooms serve an important inculcative
function, school administrators may bar provocative speech. 25 By contrast,
if the speech occurs outside the classroom, the school has less authority to
regulate it.126
Fourth, the rights and interests of the parties must be balanced. The
speaker has a fundamental right to express non-obscene ideas, and the listener
has the right to receive information. 27 Meanwhile, the school may legiti-
mately regulate speech that would substantially disrupt the school's peace
and order. 28 Once it is decided that the student speech is not obscene under
any standard, the court must scrutinize the state's claim of administrative
convenience to assess the student's right to speech.
Even in school, first amendment rights may only be limited if the state
can show a compelling need to limit the speech. 29 The state must also show
that the restriction is narrowly tailored to the asserted need. 30 Among other
things, the regulation must be sensitive to where the speech takes place. If
the speech occurs within the classroom, the state must show that the speech
substantially disrupted the educational and inculcative function of the school.
If the speech occurs outside the classroom, the state must show that the
123. See supra note 10.
124. See supra note 9.
125. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
126. As the Pico Court explained, extra-curricular activity is important for the self-enrichment
of the students. In this area of the school, indoctrination into society is not the most important
interest. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 114.
129. See supra note 28.
130. Id.
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expression may substantially disrupt peace and order in the school."'
A. Application of the Model to the Fraser Decision
The model organizes the factual issues to be resolved when analyzing a
first amendment claim by a student in a public school. Application of the
model to the facts of Fraser illustrates the usefulness of this model. Under
the first step, which is to determine whether the speech is obscene, Fraser
spoke to an audience composed of students his age and adult school officials.
Based on the maturity of the audience, it is unlikely that the listeners were
harmed by Fraser's speech. This is highlighted by the fact that there was no
factual assertion that Fraser's speech was obscene. Although the Supreme
Court characterized Fraser's speech as "lewd and obscene,'' ,32 the speech
was not patently offensive and was relatively innocuous compared to the
material in Ginsberg. 33
Second, the speech must be scrutinized to determine whether it falls into
the variable obscenity standard. The audience in Fraser consisted exclusively
of high school students and officials. In addition, the speech was contained
within the school's assembly hall and could not be heard by young children.
Thus, the age and maturity of the audience in Fraser was sufficient to treat
the speech under the adult obscenity standards. In fact, the court of appeals
recognized that high school students are not impressionable young people
who need protection from crude speech. 3 4
Third, the school may exert some authority to regulate the time, place
and manner of the speech. Arguably, a student assembly run by students
for other students is far enough removed from the classroom that school
officials have no inculcative interests. Furthermore, given that the assembly
was ostensibly political in nature, school officials have even less authority
to regulate such expression.
Finally, the rights and interests of the parties must be balanced. In
balancing the interests of the parties, the state has an interest in socializing
students and developing decent citizens. On the other hand, Fraser has an
interest in delivering his speech. Furthermore, the student listeners have an
interest in exercising their free choice of whether or not to hear the speech.
Since the audience was free to leave the assembly,'35 their interests were not
131. The Pico Court found that the school's motive for regulating the speech should be
investigated. If the motive is an unconstitutional desire to suppress ideas, then the speech cannot
be prohibited. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. However, the proposed model
suggests that a motivational inquiry be employed as a last resort. As one scholar explained,
the burden of proving an unconstitutional motive is "formidable." Rush, supra note 3, at 477
n. 105.
132. 106 S. Ct. at 3163.
133. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
134. 755 F.2d at 1363.
135. 106 S. Ct. at 3162.
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violated by Fraser's speech. Given that Fraser's speech took place outside
of the classroom, the burden is on the state to show how the listeners would
be harmed. Considering the age and maturity of the audience, no harm
could have been anticipated as a result of Fraser's speech. Therefore, Fraser's
speech would have had to cause substantial disruption to the educational
process before the state could regulate it. The record shows no such sub-
stantial disruption. 36 Thus, under the proposed model, Fraser's speech is
protected under the first amendment.
CONCLUSION
The Fraser decision is significant because it could have reaffirmed the
freedom of expression standards developed in Ginsberg, Tinker, and Pico.
Given the recent diminution in constitutional rights of students as individuals,
Fraser could have reasserted the value of student's first amendment rights
in school. The proposed model analysis for constitutionally regulating speech
in public schools, inspired by the Fraser case, acknowledges the state's interest
in carrying out its educational mission without substantial disruption. School
officials can maintain peace and order in the school in a manner consistent
with the Constitution. The model also protects the state's interest in the
well-being of the students. However, as the model bears out, the Constitution
does not grant school officials unlimited license to suppress student speech.
If student speech remains within the bounds of decency and does not
substantially disrupt the school routine, then the school may not interfere
with the speech.
The Supreme Court's decision in Fraser is confusing and alarming. The
implications of the Court's holding are twofold. First, the type of activities
within the school in which school officials have a vested interest in controlling
has widened. Second, by using unproven sensibilities of students to justify
suppressing supposedly obscene speech, the Court has further clouded the
determination of when student speech is properly regulated. Fraser may not
have left his first amendment rights at the schoolhouse door, but what those
rights are within the school environment has been substantially limited.
Robert Block
136. Id. at 3168 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
